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The aim of this chapter is threefold. First, we give a brief description of
some key features of the labor market in Denmark, some of which we ar-
gue contribute to the Danish labor markets behaving quite diﬀerently from
those in many other European countries. Second, we document in some
detail an important aspect of the functioning and ﬂexibility of the labor
markets in Denmark: the high level of worker mobility.1Third, we describe
and examine the wage structure between and within ﬁrms and changes
therein since 1980, especially with an eye on possible impacts of the trend
toward a more decentralized wage determination.
3.2 The Institutional Setting
Although the Danish labor market in many respects resembles other la-
bor markets in Europe, and Scandinavia in particular, it has a number of
distinguishing features of its own. In the following, we brieﬂy discuss some
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1. This is one of the cornerstones of the Danish “ﬂexicurity” model for labor market policy
that has attracted a lot of attention in recent years; see, for example, chapter 2 in European
Commission (2006).of them. More precisely, we look at ten features of the labor market in
Denmark.2 These are:
1. The high female labor force participation rate, which is among the
highest in the world.
2. The retirement age, which used to be relatively high, but has during
relatively few years fallen substantially.
3. The replacement ratio of unemployment beneﬁts for low-wage earn-
ers, which to the best of our knowledge is the highest in the world. The re-
placement ratio is considerably lower for high-wage earners, but due to the
compressed wage structure, a nonnegligible portion of the employees has
a very high replacement ratio.
4. The relatively widespread eligibility for unemployment beneﬁt.
5. Voluntary membership of unemployment insurance funds.
6. Wage bargaining that used to be highly centralized, but has gradually
become more decentralized.
7. Trade union membership and the coverage of unions are both high by
international standards.
8. Weak job protection for blue-collar workers and only a modest pro-
tection for white-collar workers.
9. Indirect wage costs are internationally very low in Denmark, whereas
the rate of direct taxation of wage income is among the highest in the world.
10. Compared to many other countries, agreements between employers
and trade unions constitute a more important regulatory mechanism than
legislation and government interventions. This is one of the key elements
in “the Danish mode.”
Each of these aspects has consequences for the behavior of people, ﬁrms
and their employees, and for the functioning of the Danish labor market.
3.2.1 Female Labor Force Participation
The high female participation is a well-known characteristic feature of
the Danish labor market. The growing female share of employment has
been facilitated by a massive growth in child care facilities. Child care is to
a large extent provided by the public sector; six out of ten children in the
age group one to six years are in publicly provided daycare. Daycare used
to be highly subsidized but is now less so. Female participation started to
grow in the 1970s in close connection to the growth of the public sector and
the creation of the welfare state. Many of the jobs held by women, partic-
ularly in the public sector, were originally part-time jobs. Today only about
8 to 9 percent of women in the age range twenty-ﬁve to ﬁfty-ﬁve work part
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2. Some of these speciﬁc features make the labor market in Denmark in some, but ab-
solutely not all, respects look more like that in the United States than labor markets in other
European countries.time. The increase in female labor force participation has occurred in par-
allel with a shift from part-time to full-time work. In recent years, part-
time work is common among young women and older women and sectoral
diﬀerences with respect to the part-time work are small.
3.2.2 Pension Systems and Retirement
Denmark has for many years had a pension system that provides the en-
tire population (and not only the working population) with old age pen-
sion, for men from the age of sixty-seven and for women from the age of
sixty-ﬁve (recently the old age retirement has gradually been lowered to
sixty-ﬁve also for men). This is a pay-as-you-go system, where beneﬁts are
regulated by the parliament and are paid out of current tax revenue. In
1979 an early retirement program was introduced. All members of the un-
employment insurance (UI) system could from the age of sixty receive a
beneﬁt corresponding to the UI until the recipient is entitled to normal
pension. In addition, a publicly provided disability pension is available for
all age groups, where eligibility is determined on health grounds. The pro-
portion of the labor force receiving disability pension was in 2000 about 10
percent. Especially as a consequence of the early retirement program, the
average retirement age has been falling over time. Thus, in 2004, only a
third of the age group sixty to sixty-six were in the labor force.
The early retirement program has been particularly important for older
workers because employers are reluctant to hire unemployed workers in
their late or mid-ﬁfties because they expect that they will go on early re-
tirement as they become eligible. Bingley and Lanot (2004) have shown
that there is no ﬁrm eﬀect with respect to the use of the program, indicat-
ing that employers are not systematically pushing elderly employees into
early retirement. Rather, it is other factors, such as the work situation of
the spouse that are important.
3.2.3 Unemployment Beneﬁts
The unemployment beneﬁt system is still partly organized according to
“Bismarckian principles.” Thus, workers can voluntarily choose to become
members of more than thirty diﬀerent occupational unemployment insur-
ance funds. Membership and eligibility for unemployment beneﬁts are
both conditional on the person having had a job for at least one year. The
unemployment beneﬁt is 90 percent of the previous wage but with a maxi-
mum of 1,800€ per month. Consequently, the replacement ratio for low-
wage workers is 90 percent, but is lower for higher-income earners. Unem-
ployment beneﬁts are taxed, but a special tax rate of 8 percent on all earned
income does not apply to unemployment beneﬁts. Together, the high re-
placement ratio and the asymmetric tax treatment create an incentive
problem for low-wage workers, as they earn little by working compared to
being unemployed. It has been shown that 23 percent of all employed
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by working relative to what would have received as unemployment beneﬁt
claimants; see Smith (1998).
Unemployment beneﬁts are obtained from the ﬁrst day of unemploy-
ment and are paid for one year without any obligations other than seeking
work. After one year of unemployment, the UI recipient has to take part
in an active labor market policy program. A high replacement ratio, cou-
pled with the fact that there is almost no experience rating for either em-
ployers or workers, implies that there are many short spells of unemploy-
ment. Even in years of low unemployment, more than 20 percent of all
wage earners have experienced at least one spell of unemployment. A high
proportion of these spells are concentrated around Christmas, New Year,
and other vacations. As a result, for low-pay workers, total working hours
are about 80 percent of the total normal hours (to be explained in the fol-
lowing).
The UI system is ﬁnanced by general tax revenue but operated by the
private UI funds. The UI funds are formally unrelated to the trade unions,
but membership in the UI system is typically considered as part of a pack-
age, which also includes union membership. As a consequence, about 80 
percent of the wage earners are members of the UI system, and about 85 per-
cent are members of trade unions (Neumann, Pederson, and Westergaard-
Nielsen 1991).
3.2.4 The Danish Model for Cooperation
The overall labor market model in Denmark is often called “The Danish
Model.” The key ingredient in the Danish model is that the trade unions’
and the employers’ federation (the social partners) make agreements on
most regulatory issues, and the role of the government is to “pick up and
pay the bill.” The social partners take responsibility for wage bargaining
and wage setting. They also make agreements concerning normal working
hours and set rules for labor protection with respect to overtime and work
environment.3 As a consequence, there is no minimum wage legislation in
Denmark. Nevertheless, the social partners have agreed that no member
ﬁrm will pay less than 89.50 DKK per hour plus 15 percent vacation pay,
that is, altogether 13.8€. Although the employers’ organizations do not
have full coverage, the unions are very keen on identifying workplaces pay-
ing less. According to anecdotal evidence, workers are being paid less in the
unorganized parts of the retail sector and in the hotels and restaurant in-
dustries.
The role of the government in Denmark is to provide unemployment
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3. When the current Liberal/Conservative government has made several propositions re-
garding the work environment, both employers’ and workers’ organizations have been criti-
cal of state intervention into the area.beneﬁts and to retrain workers who have lost their jobs because their pro-
ductivity in their current job is too low. The government also provides
health care and disability pensions. In other words, the government pro-
vides the safety net. This is also the case with respect to those who are not
covered by unemployment insurance. These workers are in general eligible
for social assistance, which is of the same size as the UI beneﬁt. The main
diﬀerence is that all payments are means tested.
The Danish labor market model has many features in common with 
the Swedish model, and because of the similarities, they are sometimes
grouped together under the label of “the Nordic Labor Market Model.” The
main idea is that whenever a ﬁrm cannot keep workers productive in their
current job, the government should take responsibility and retrain workers.
After retraining, the workers should now be more productive and can,
therefore, be hired in a new ﬁrm and thereby increase overall productivity.
There are, however, distinct diﬀerences between the Danish and Swedish
models. One of these is that the Danish model does not prohibit layoﬀs,
whereas the Swedish model is considerably more restrictive in this respect.
The idea behind the Danish model is that ﬁrms should not be forced to
maintain a large workforce if it is no longer proﬁtable to do so. In such a
situation, it is better for society that ﬁrms can rehire workers where these
workers’ labor is more productive. This increases overall ﬂexibility and
productivity. Of course, it also puts a burden on the workers, and that is
probably the main reason for the relatively high unemployment beneﬁt in
Denmark (at least for low-wage earners). Another diﬀerence is that the
Swedish model builds heavily on a tripartite cooperation between govern-
ment, unions, and employers. So in Denmark, the government provides in-
come security, while the labor market organizations deliver ﬂexibility.
Hence, the system is called “ﬂexicurity.”
3.2.5 Working Hours
In Denmark so-called normal working hours are determined as the out-
come of the general wage bargaining between the trade unions’ and the 
employers’ federation. As elsewhere, the normal working times have been
gradually shortened in Denmark, too. The reduction has on average been
about 0.7 percent per year (Andersen et al. 2001). Its sources have changed
over time. In the late 1960s and in the beginning of the 1970s, the reduction
was in weekly hours, followed by a period when the annual vacation was
increased from four to ﬁve weeks. In the 1990s, the reduction was again im-
plemented as a reduction in the number of weekly hours; from forty to
thirty-seven hours. Recently, a gradual expansion of vacation weeks from
ﬁve to six weeks has begun.
Annual normal working hours in Denmark are among the lowest in the
world. Only the Germans work less than the 1,690 hours per year worked
on average by the Danes. However, far from all work that much, especially
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1,140 hours in Denmark, while it was about 1,700 hours in the United
States in the same period. The main reason is, no doubt, that the Danish
UI system is not only subsidizing the search between two jobs but also tem-
porary layoﬀs.
3.2.6 Wage Bargaining
Collective bargaining in Denmark has a long history—in fact, the ﬁrst
general collective wage agreement was settled as early as 1889—and for al-
most a century, this was the predominant mode of wage determination. In
recent years, Danish wage setting has undergone large changes, which are
brieﬂy described in this chapter’s sequel.
Until the beginning of the 1980s, wages were set in biannual national
wage negotiations. A key feature of wage determination was an automatic
wage indexation system, which linked hourly wages to the consumer price
index (CPI) net of indirect taxes and subsidies. Twice per year, hourly wage
increases were triggered by each three-point change in the net CPI. Al-
though the indexation was not complete, it accounted for a large share of
wage increases.
General wage negotiations took place between the Danish Federation of
Trade Unions (LO) and the Danish Employers’ Federation (DA), typically
every second year. The LO and DA set the pattern for the entire manual
workers’ labor market. Although only about 40 percent of the private-
sector labor force was employed in ﬁrms where both the employees and the
employer were organized, the great majority of employers and, hence, also
of all workplaces, applied the results of the general agreement. The nego-
tiations and the general agreement were split into general and speciﬁc 
issues such as working hours, vacations, and minimum-wage tariﬀs.4 For
the vast majority of white-collar workers and public-sector employees, the
wage-setting mechanism is quite similar regarding negotiations, timing,
and so on to that for blue-collar workers. The diﬀerence has been that these
groups have never received as much in terms of wage drift between the gen-
eral contracts as blue-collar workers, but have been compensated for the
wage drift in the form of larger wage increases in the central bargainings.
From the beginning of the 1980s, there has been a tendency toward more
and more decentralization of wage bargaining and wage setting. A ﬁrst
step was the abolishment of wage indexation in 1982. From 1987 to 1993,
negotiations concerning wages were done at the industry level. From 1993
onward, the general wage negotiations have mainly focused on working
hours, pensions, sickness pay, and vacation. At the same time, wage bar-
106 Tor Eriksson and Niels Westergaard-Nielsen
4. As mentioned in the preceding, Denmark does not have a legally set minimum wage.
However, the lowest tariﬀ wage agreed upon in the wage negotiations sets a ﬂoor for wages,
and changes in the minimum-wage tariﬀ shift the entire wage rate distribution.gaining proper has moved down to the industry or ﬁrm levels, and an in-
creasing share of wage agreements have been made at the individual em-
ployee level. In 1993, 71 percent of all agreements in the market for man-
ual labor were of this type.
While wage setting has been decentralized in the private-labor market,
wage bargaining in the public sector is still highly centralized, with biannual
national-level negotiations. However, a new wage system, called “Ny-løn”
(New-wage), has considerably fewer wage tariﬀs than before, and in the
public sector also the intention is to move toward more individualized pay
according to qualiﬁcations, job functions, and individual performance.
The performance pay element in public-sector wages remains rather small,
however.
3.2.7 The Labor Market and the Macroeconomy
Figure 3.1describes the development of unemployment and annual per-
centage changes in real gross domestic product (GDP) since 1980. As can
be seen from the ﬁgure, the time series changes in unemployment are
chieﬂy driven by changes in GDP. From the mid-nineties there has been a
long period of continuous decline in open unemployment, and so at the
end of the period, Denmark is one of the not-so-numerous European coun-
tries that have succeeded in lowering their unemployment rates to levels
not experienced since the seventies.
It should be noted, however, that as active labor market policies have
played an increasingly important role, and as participants in active labor
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Fig. 3.1 Development in unemployment and annual growth in GDPmarket programs are not counted as unemployed, open unemployment
has become a more and more dubious measure of the state of the labor
market. We have, therefore, in ﬁgure 3.1 also included an adjusted unem-
ployment rate that includes individuals in active labor market programs
among the unemployed and, consequently, also in the labor force. The
main diﬀerence is in the levels, while the peaks and troughs are the same. It
is worth noting that whereas the rate of unemployment during business
cycle upturns is lower at the end of the period than in the mid-eighties, this
is not true for the adjusted unemployment rate.
3.2.8 Flexibility
The institutional framework of the Danish labor market implies that
there are few barriers to mobility between ﬁrms. For employers, the costs
of laying oﬀ workers are low because of the absence of severance pay legis-
lation and experience rating in the unemployment insurance system, as
well as weak job security, particularly of blue-collar workers. For the em-
ployees, costs of changing employer or experiencing unemployment spells
are reduced by generous unemployment beneﬁts, which are readily avail-
able to insured employees, and by the fact that many social beneﬁts, pen-
sions, and vacation are independent of the individual’s current employer
and are, hence, transferable. As a consequence, the Danish labor market is
characterized by both high job mobility and high wage mobility.
3.3 Data Sources
The main data source used in the following empirical analyses is the 
so-called IDA-database (Integreret Database for Arbejdsmarkedsforskning)
kept by Statistics Denmark. The IDA is a longitudinal database that con-
tains information about all individuals aged ﬁfteen to seventy-four (demo-
graphic characteristics, education, labor market experience, tenure, and
earnings) and employees in all plants in Denmark during the period 1980
to 2001. This information has been collected by merging information from
several registers in Statistics Denmark with the help of unique identiﬁ-
cation numbers for individuals and plants. The persons and plants are
matched at the end of November in each year. Consequently, only changes
between ends-of-Novembers are accounted for (not intermittent changes).
Statistics Denmark has aggregated the plant-level information to the level
of ﬁrms for the ﬁrst time in the late nineties for the Pay and Performance
project at Aarhus School of Business and continues to do so for the Center
for Corporate Performance with the help of the unique identiﬁcation num-
bers of individuals and plants (ﬁrms), additional information from other
registers, as well as surveys of ﬁrms or individuals that have information
about the same identiﬁcation numbers.
The background data for the IDA consists of various registers, supple-
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come from the Census in 1970 and from reports from all educational insti-
tutions on their current population of students and their completion. This
means that the educational register contains status and all upgrades after
the census.
The wage information is constructed as follows. The point of departure
is register data containing tax-based information on the total earnings paid
to each individual worker during the year. Earnings may consist of earn-
ings from several employers. The data are considered to be of high quality
because the tax authorities use them to assess each employee’s earnings. At
the same time, the wage records constitute deductible labor costs for the
employers.
The number of working hours is estimated as follows. The employers’
contributions to a comprehensive pension scheme are determined by the
number of hours worked as a fraction of normal annual working hours.
Thus, for hourly paid workers—that is, all blue-collar workers—pension
contributions up to 1993 were proportional to the number of hours worked.
For monthly paid salaried employees, the supplementary pension is com-
puted based on the normal length of the working day according to a three-
step scale. The IDA makes use of information about the employers’ con-
tributions to the pension schemes to compute the annual number of
working hours for each individual. It should be noted that these are esti-
mates. One problem is that the supplementary pay for overtime hours does
not yield additional points for the pension schemes. Hence, overtime hours
are not properly accounted for.
Hourly wage rates are calculated by dividing the earnings at a particular
employer with the estimated annual working hours at that employer. The
estimated hourly wage rates are most reliable for the hourly paid workers.
However, after 1993, pension contributions have gradually also been paid
during sickness and unemployment spells. Consequently, as from the mid-
nineties, the hourly wage information is likely to be of poorer quality.
3.4 Worker Mobility
This section looks into worker mobility in somewhat more detail. We
start by considering the frequently used measures, entry and exit rates, 
calculated in the case of entry rates as the proportion of new employees in
the ﬁrm in end-of-November year tas compared to end-of-November year
t – 1 and for exit rates the proportion of employees who have exited from
the ﬁrm since end-of-November in year t – 1.5 Entry and exit rates to and
from Danish private-sector ﬁrms during 1981 to 2001 are shown in ﬁgure
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5. Because the comparisons are between end-of-Novembers, and thus neglect mobility be-
tween intermittent short-term jobs, the entry and exit rates are downward biased.3.2. We can see that the entry and exit rates show no trend and ﬂuctuate
around 26 percent. The variations in the entry rate are clearly larger than
for exits. The ﬂuctuations appear to be procyclical for both entry and exit
rates. Thus, hires and separations both increase in upturns and decrease in
downturns. On average, about one third of all annual job exits are to non-
employment states; see Frederiksen and Westergaard-Nielsen (2007).
Looking beyond the average entry and exit rates reveals that they diﬀer
considerably between diﬀerent parts of ﬁrms’ wage distributions. Figure
3.3 shows the entry and exit rates in the top and bottom quartiles of the
wage distribution in each ﬁrm. Not surprisingly, mobility is substantially
higher in the lowest quartile. In the lowest quartile, entry rates exceed exit
rates with a wide margin, whereas the relative magnitudes are reversed in
the top quartile. Naturally, this reﬂects the fact that people tend to get hired
at the bottom and leave from positions further up in the wage distribution.
Mobility out of low-paid work is, in general, high, although it should be
noted that a third of transitions out of low-wage jobs is out of the labor
force; see Bolvig (2004). The two other thirds are to higher-paid employ-
ment within the same ﬁrm and to jobs in other ﬁrms, respectively. Notably,
Bolvig also ﬁnds that ﬁrms with a higher-than-average share of low-wage
workers have a lower workforce turnover than other ﬁrms. The entry rates
in the bottom quartile vary procyclically and are quite volatile. Entry into
the top quartile displays the same pattern, but the variation is less pro-
nounced.
Table 3.1 paints a picture of the composition and development of job
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Fig. 3.2 Exit and entry ratesspells and their duration. The numbers refer to the year 2000. We can see
that in that year, out of 1.6 million employees, almost half a million had
separated from a job since the previous year. Nearly one third of all em-
ployees (a little over half a million) were in another job (actually, at another
employer) compared to the previous year. From the third column, it can be
seen that in a cross-section, most people employed in Danish private-sector
ﬁrms—63.2 percent—are in jobs that have lasted less than ﬁve years. Less
than 10 percent are in jobs that have lasted more than ﬁfteen years. This
does not, however, mean that merely about 10 percent of employees end up
in jobs lasting ﬁfteen years or more.
The high turnover rates do not necessarily imply that all employees in
the ﬁrms leave with the same frequency and that, as a consequence, long-
tenured jobs are thin on the ground. There are a number of reasons why the
cross-sectional picture is misleading (see Hall 1982). First, and obviously,
in order to have been in a job lasting for ﬁfteen years or longer the em-
ployee has to have been in the labor force for at least ﬁfteen years. Second,
an additional reason why the “population at risk” is considerably less than
the total workforce is that most of job changes occur in the beginning of
workers’ labor market careers. Therefore, one should not expect to ﬁnd
many long-term employment relationships before the employees have
turned forty. As can be seen from the last three columns in the table, the
probability of staying in the same ﬁrm for one, ﬁve, or ten additional years
increases with tenure. Thus, for instance, the probability that a person with
ten years of tenure will remain with the same employer for ﬁve (ten) addi-
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Fig. 3.3 Exit and entry rates for workers from diﬀerent positions of ﬁrms’ wage
distributionstional years is 51 (27) percent. Taking these features into account leads, as
has been shown by Hall (1982) for the United States, to a completely diﬀer-
ent picture of the prevalence of long-term jobs: despite high worker
turnover, long job spells can still be common. Does the same apply also to
the Danish labor market?
Table 3.2 gives the proportion of ﬁve-year age groups with ﬁve years of
current tenure who go on to reach tenure for twenty years or more. These
are calculated using the so-called contemporaneous retention method of
Hall (1982). We have computed these shares for two years: 1990 and 2000,
respectively. Moreover, for comparison purposes, we include Hall’s esti-
mates from the United States in 1978. Three features of the table are worth
noting. First, the proportion of individuals whose eventual tenure will ex-
ceed twenty years was higher in 1990 than ten years later, and this was true
for all age groups. Of course, this diﬀerence may simply reﬂect the fact that
1990 was a business cycle downturn year, whereas 2000 was an upturn year.
As we saw earlier, mobility is procyclical. Second, considerably higher pro-
portions of the employees are in lifetime jobs than what is observed in cross
sections. Thus, the high annual turnover rates, hovering between 25 and 30
percent, are consistent with the observation that a considerable portion—
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Table 3.1 Distribution of tenure and contemporaneous retention rates in 2000
Probability of:
Tenure Staying 1  Staying 5  Staying 10
(in years) Movers Stayers additional year more years more years
1 215,638 292,641 0.58 0.35 0.18
2 85,371 169,124 0.66 0.35 0.18
3 50,866 102,096 0.67 0.42 0.21
4 32,284 73,264 0.69 0.47 0.24
5 30,090 60,748 0.67 0.50 0.26
6 13,924 52,413 0.79 0.51 0.27
7 10,274 44,692 0.81 0.51 0.27
8 7,216 35,145 0.83 0.51 0.27
9 5,849 32,988 0.85 0.51 0.27
10 11,934 35,854 0.75 0.51 0.28
11 5,312 26,475 0.83 0.52 0.29
12 3,194 22,083 0.87 0.53 0.31
13 2,816 18,671 0.87 0.53 0.31
14 2,888 19,189 0.87 0.53 0.30
15 2,385 16,880 0.88 0.54 0.29
16 1,962 14,748 0.88 0.56 0.29
17 1,601 11,786 0.88 0.58 0.28
18 1,094 8,599 0.89 0.59 0.29
19 982 7,612 0.89 0.57 0.28
20 836 6,666 0.89 0.54 0.25
20  10,253 66,655between 25 and 35 percent of prime age workers—land jobs in which they
stay for substantial parts of their working lives. Third, the percentages for
Denmark appear to be somewhat lower than those for the United States.
One should be cautious here, as the age structures of the U.S. and Danish
labor forces diﬀer somewhat. Still, it is clearly the case that the proportion
staying on longer is not larger, but rather smaller, in Denmark than in the
United States. This accords with our preceding arguments—that the insti-
tutional setup of the Danish labor market strongly facilitates mobility.
3.5 The Changing Wage Structure
Next, we brieﬂy consider some changes in the wage structure and, in par-
ticular, changes in the dispersion of wages. The wage concept used is real
monthly wages (expressed in 1990 prices), calculated by multiplying each
individual’s hourly wage rate by the number of a full-time employee’s
monthly working hours. The population studied is, unless otherwise stated,
the private-sector ﬁrms with a minimum of twenty employees. In order to
reduce measurement errors in the monthly wages, employees who have
been in their current jobs for less than one year are omitted.
Figures 3.4and 3.5 document changes in the distribution of individuals’
wages. We may note a clear, albeit not strong, increase in wage dispersion
during the twenty-year period. The increase has been about the same mag-
nitude during both the eighties and the nineties. The period when wage 
diﬀerentials widened the most is 1987 to 1994; that is, the ﬁrst period of a
shift toward decentralized wage bargaining. In fact, the changes during 
the second half of the nineties are relatively small, especially in view of the
changes in both wage setting and the increased adoption of new pay prac-
tices in ﬁrms (Eriksson 2003a). There has been an increase on both sides of
the median, but during the nineties, wage dispersion below the median has
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Table 3.2 Proportions reaching 20  years of tenure
Denmark United States
Age group 1990 2000 1978 (Hall, 1982)
20–24 71.3 58.5 36.6
25–29 34.6 29.6 44.9
30–34 26.9 24.5 39.3
35–39 29.3 25.2 35.9
40–44 28.4 25.9 25.2
45–49 14.1 11.0 8.7
50–54 10.6 7.3 4.3
Note: The numbers show the proportion of those in each age group with ﬁve years of tenure
who go on to reach tenure of twenty years or more.been ﬂat, whereas above the median there is a noteworthy jump in the mid-
nineties, leading to a stronger increase during that decade; see ﬁgure 3.5.
Changes in the dispersion of ﬁrm wages have followed a slightly diﬀer-
ent pattern: from being virtually ﬂat in the eighties, the distribution of ﬁrm
wages has widened during the second half of the period; see ﬁgure 3.6.
Turning next to a decomposition of the wage dispersion into within- and
between-ﬁrm components, we restrict the sample to ﬁrms with ﬁfty or
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Fig. 3.4 Wage dispersion 1980 to 2000 as measured by the P90/P10-ratio
Fig. 3.5 P90/P50 and P50/P10-ratios, 1980 to 2000more employees in order to make the within-ﬁrm dispersion concept
meaningful. Two points emerge from ﬁgure 3.7. There has been a trendwise
increase in between-ﬁrm variance in wages, whereas wage dispersion
within ﬁrms fell during the eighties up to 1990, from which time on it has
been increasing in tandem with that of between-ﬁrm wages. By 2000,
within-ﬁrm wage dispersion has not reached the level of the early eighties.
Thus, the observed increase in overall wage dispersion is predominantly
due to increasing wage diﬀerentials between ﬁrms.
3.6 Changes in Wage Setting in Larger Danish Firms, 1980 to 2000
As was discussed in the preceding, Denmark has, during the two most
recent decades, experienced a shift in wage bargaining from a highly cen-
tralized system to a considerably more decentralized wage setting. The end
of the era of centralized wage bargaining came in two steps: ﬁrst in 1987,
when bargaining moved down to the level of industries, and second, and
more importantly, involving a larger share of wage setting actually being
done at the level of ﬁrms, in 1994 to 1995. It seems plausible to assume that
as a consequence of the decentralization of the wage-bargaining and wage-
setting processes, the relative weights of employer and employee eﬀects for
the resulting wage structure may have changed. The aim of this section is
to describe and analyze these changes.6
A shift to more decentralized wage setting is, however, not the only pos-
sible cause of changes in ﬁrms’ internal wage structure. The much-discussed
skill-biased technological change suggests that not only do returns to ob-
servable skills increase, but the returns to unobservable skills as picked up
Wage and Labor Mobility in Denmark, 1980–2000 115
6. This section draws heavily on Eriksson (2003b).
Fig. 3.6 Coeﬃcient of variation of ﬁrm average wagesby the ﬁrm eﬀects in a standard cross-sectional earnings equation may in-
crease as well (Katz and Autor 1999). Thus, inequality among employers
should rise in tandem with rising returns to observable skills. Another
source of changes in ﬁrms’ wage structures is changes in ﬁrms’ local mo-
nopoly power. Deregulation of several markets and increasing interna-
tional competition, due to the implementation of the European Single
Market Program in 1988 to 1992, and steadily falling transportation and
information transmission costs have eroded ﬁrms’ product market rents.
When this is the case, we would expect, over time, that inequality among
employers declined.7
How could decentralization contribute to changes? One way of thinking
about it is that under centralized wage setting, ﬁrm-speciﬁc bargaining is
constrained and, hence, local bargaining power is in general low and varies
little across ﬁrms. With weakening centralized wage-setting institutions,
local bargaining power rises and, consequently, we would expect to see an
increase in the variability of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc component of wages.
Next we examine changes in wage setting in Danish ﬁrms from the per-
spective of eventual changes in their internal labor markets. For this reason,
the analysis is restricted to a subsample from the IDA database consisting
of larger private-sector ﬁrms. More precisely, the sample we henceforth ex-
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7. The prediction concerning the impact of increased competition on within-ﬁrm inequal-
ity is ambiguous; see, for example, Cuñat and Guadalupe (2006).
Fig. 3.7 Variation in wages within and between ﬁrms, 1980 to 2000amine consists of 222 ﬁrms that have been above the size of 200 employees
in each year during the period 1980 to 2000.8 The number of observations
on individuals varied between 457,821 in 1990 and 417,267 in 1995.
Wage equations, with hourly wage rates as the dependent variable and
observable individual characteristics of age, education, gender, and tenure
plus employer-speciﬁc intercepts as explanatory variables, are estimated.
The estimations are carried out for ﬁve diﬀerent cross-sections: 1980, 1985,
1990, 1995, and 2000. In closing, we brieﬂy present and discuss some of the
results obtained.
It should be emphasized that not only does the population of ﬁrms diﬀer
from the one examined in the previous section, but also the wage concept—
the hourly wage rate—is diﬀerent. This explains why we observe from table
3.3 a somewhat diﬀerent picture of changes in the wage structure: wage dis-
persion ﬁrst decreased during the eighties and then increased during the
nineties. In 2000, between-persons wage inequality was still smaller than
twenty years ago, but had almost returned to its 1985 level. As we will come
back to later, during the same period, between-ﬁrm wage inequality has
grown considerably.
From table 3.4, where the estimates of the returns to the skill variables
and gender are collected, we can ﬁrst of all observe that including the ﬁrm
ﬁxed eﬀects into the estimating equations does very little to change the es-
timates to the human capital variables. On the other hand, we can see that
some of the estimated returns to skill have changed over time. Thus, dur-
ing the eighties, the age-earnings proﬁles became successively steeper but
have not changed much since. Returns to tenure have also increased, al-
though it should be noted that their magnitude is relatively small: less than
1 percent per year.
The largest changes have occurred with respect to returns to education.
The estimated return to one additional year of education has almost
doubled during the twenty-year period. The return started to grow from a
very low level indeed and has at the end of the period reached about the
same magnitude as one additional year of labor market experience. All in
all, the estimates indicate that there has been an increase in the returns to
observable skills according to several dimensions during the period under
study.
For the gender-diﬀerential estimates, it makes a diﬀerence whether the
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8. About half of the ﬁrms have less than 500 employees, and about the same proportion of
the ﬁrms are from the manufacturing sector, whereas the remaining 20 and 30 percent are in
the trade and services sectors, respectively. The ﬁrms diﬀer substantially with respect to em-
ployment growth; a little over 40 percent have experienced a decline in employment during
the two decades. The workforces in the sample ﬁrms consist of 60 percent of males (diﬀering
from the whole Danish labor force, where the gender shares are equal—the diﬀerence is due
to the fact that the ﬁrms are from the private sector), and their skill structures have undergone
considerable changes during that period, with a notable decline in the share of unskilled blue-
collar workers. At the same time, the age structure has remained remarkably stable.ﬁrm eﬀects are included, as entering them leads to a drop in the diﬀerential
by about one third. During the two decades there was ﬁrst a decrease in the
male-female wage diﬀerential, but this decline seems to have leveled oﬀ
during the nineties. This corroborates what has been found in the gender
gap studies. Most of that literature does not, however, account for the de-
mand site.9The results in table 3.4 demonstrate that this can be misleading.
Moreover, there is an interesting pattern insofar that the gender gap re-
duction is much larger when ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects are controlled for.
Table 3.5 displays the adjusted R2 statistics from estimations with the
ﬁrm eﬀects only and with ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects and human capital, respec-
tively. We may observe ﬁrst that on their own the ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects explain
an increasing portion of diﬀerences in individual wage diﬀerentials. Sec-
ond, the “full” model’s explanatory power has also increased over time.
The dispersion of “raw” ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects has increased; in fact, it has
more than doubled; see table 3.6. The increase has been especially pro-
nounced in the nineties. Together with increases in returns to observable
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9. Datta Gupta and Rothstein (2005) is an exception, using Danish data.
Table 3.3 Between-persons wage inequality






Table 3.4 Returns to skill estimates
Years of  Gender: 
Year Age Age2/100 school Tenure male
1980 0.041 –0.004 0.028 0.004 0.236
(0.039) (–0.004) (0.030) (0.003) (0.181)
1985 0.042 –0.004 0.027 0.004 0.210
(0.041) (–0.004) (0.029) (0.003) (0.145)
1990 0.057 –0.006 (0.031 0.006 0.192
(0.056) (–0.006) 0.033) (0.003) (0.120)
1995 0.055 –0.006 0.044 0.008 0.180
(0.052) (–0.005) (0.045) (0.006) (0.113)
2000 0.052 –0.005 0.050 0.008 0.192
(0.050) (–0.005) (0.051) (0.006) (0.115)
Notes:Standard errors are omitted because they are all so small. Numbers in parentheses are
estimates from equations including ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects.individual characteristics, this is consistent with ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects picking
up sorting according to unobservable skills.10
Although part of the increase goes away when observables are controlled
for, a considerable portion remains. Thus, changes in observable skills are
not able to explain the whole observed increase in between-ﬁrm inequality.
The observed pattern is, however, also consistent with an increasing dis-
persion of bargaining power as a result of weakening of centralized bar-
gaining institutions. In contrast to the changes mentioned in the preced-
ing, the dispersion of the residuals of the wage equations displays no trend,
but varies around a stable mean. The fact that the dispersion of ﬁxed eﬀects
has not decreased, but rather increased, indicates that increasing competi-
tion has not lead to the predicted decline in between-employer inequality.
Let us now consider what has happened to the persistence of ﬁrm eﬀects
over time. The top panel of table 3.7 answers that question by measuring
the “persistence” by means of autocorrelations: corr [FE(f,t), FE(f,t–T)]
for diﬀerent time gaps T (ﬁve, ten, and ﬁfteen years, respectively).11 The
ﬁxed eﬀects are taken from the wage regressions that include human capi-
tal controls.12The key message from the table is that there have been no ma-
jor changes in the persistence in ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects over time. There is a
slight decline in the ﬁve-year correlations, but this provides only limited evi-
dence of a weakening importance of internal labor markets. The persist-
ence is fairly strong and does not decay rapidly as the time gap is widened.
The same exercise was also carried out for rank correlations in the bottom
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10. Davis and Haltiwanger (1991) have found a similar pattern for U.S. manufacturing dur-
ing the sixties, seventies, and eighties.
11. The abbreviation FE denotes the ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects.
12. Excluding controls leads to somewhat higher correlations, but the pattern observed in
the top panel of tab1e 3.7 remains intact.
Table 3.5 Adjusted R2
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Firm ﬁxed eﬀects only 0.190 0.179 0.226 0.267 0.283
Firm ﬁxed eﬀects   human capital 0.308 0.379 0.451 0.498 0.483
Table 3.6 Dispersion (standard deviation) of ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects





2000 0.259 0.207panel of table 3.7. The pattern with respect to changes over time is the
same, except that the decay associated with lengthening the time diﬀer-
ences becomes stronger. At any rate, the results of both tables indicate that
ﬁrms that pay above (below) the average also are very likely to continue do-
ing that ﬁve or ten years later.
Eriksson (2003b) also estimated the wage equations separately for each
ﬁrm and year and retained the coeﬃcient estimates from each regression
and used them as data. The ﬁrst thing looked at is the changes in their 
between-ﬁrm spread over time. The mean across ﬁrms estimates of the re-
turn to schooling, say, diﬀers somewhat from those reported in table 3.4,
which were based on estimating the equation on all ﬁrms. The dispersion
of the coeﬃcients for age, schooling, tenure, and gender is set out in table
3.8. From this it can be seen that not only has the mean returns to school-
ing increased, but its dispersion has, too. The development of the age co-
eﬃcients is diﬀerent; they ﬁrst increase and then decline. The gender wage
gap coeﬃcient, which, on average, has ﬁrst declined and then has stayed
ﬂat, displays an increasing dispersion across ﬁrms over time. Hence, over-
all there appears to have been a tendency toward an increase in the spread,
not only in ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects, but also in how ﬁrms reward diﬀerent observ-
able individual traits of their employees.
A second thing the estimated ﬁrmwise coeﬃcients are used for is to look
at their persistence, again by means of computed autocorrelations. The
ﬁve-year autocorrelations for age, schooling, tenure, and gender are col-
lected in table 3.9. Strong internal labor markets would imply highly per-
sistent ﬁrm-speciﬁc returns. This is also what is found, although the corre-
lations are somewhat lower than for ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects. Moreover, for
schooling and gender, a decline in the persistence can be observed. Conse-
quently, there is some indication that internal structures have become more
ﬂexible. The changes do not appear to be large, however.
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Table 3.7 Firm ﬁxed eﬀects persistence by autocorrelations and rank correlations
Year –5 years –10 years –15 years
A. Firm ﬁxed eﬀects persistence
1985 0.870
1990 0.837 0.697
1995 0.836 0.692 0.588
2000 0.824 0.695 0.601
B. Firm ﬁxed eﬀects persistence—rank correlations
1985 0.761
1990 0.794 0.589
1995 0.727 0.610 0.403
2000 0.795 0.600 0.486
Note: Autocorrelations of ﬁxed eﬀects estimated from wage equations including controls.Summarizing the analysis of the larger ﬁrms, it was found that there has
been a clear increase in between-ﬁrm wage inequality. This is not consis-
tent with the notion that increased competition in the product markets
erodes ﬁrm-speciﬁc rents. Between-employee wage inequality ﬁrst de-
creased but increased during the nineties, and at the same time, returns to
human capital, in particular schooling, have increased. The dispersion in
ﬁrm-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects has increased over time, which is consistent with
both skill-biased technological change and weakened centralized wage
bargaining. The employer eﬀects are relatively persistent, and there are no
traces of signiﬁcant changes in this. The same holds for returns to human
capital at the level of the ﬁrm. Both the observable and the time-invariant
unobservable worker and employer characteristics, respectively, have be-
come more important in explaining wage inequality.
3.7 Concluding Remarks
The key messages of this chapter are two. First, the institutional setup of
the Danish labor market diﬀers not only from that found in most other Eu-
ropean countries but also from that in the neighboring Nordic countries.
A main diﬀerence is the absence of barriers to mobility. In a sense, this is
only natural, as for almost a century Danish wage setting was highly cen-
tralized and characterized by a very compressed wage structure that left
only limited scope for employers to adjust to changing labor market con-
ditions through wage adjustment. Worker mobility is indeed high. We
show that mobility is about as high, or even higher, as in the highly ﬂuid
U.S. labor market. But we also document that although labor turnover rates
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Table 3.8 Dispersion (standard deviation) of regression coeﬃcients across ﬁrms
Year  age  schooling  tenure  gender
1980 0.012 0.012 0.017 0.110
1985 0.030 0.017 0.012 0.113
1990 0.020 0.028 0.007 0.139
1995 0.013 0.031 0.013 0.164
2000 0.016 0.028 0.012 0.168
Table 3.9 The persistence of  s over time (5-year autocorrelations)
Year Age Schooling Tenure Gender
1985 0.579 0.721 0.697 0.836
1990 0.731 0.670 0.655 0.730
1995 0.777 0.692 0.671 0.737
2000 0.724 0.656 0.649 0.685are high, a considerable portion of workers are in long-term employment
relationships.
Second, the ongoing process toward increasingly decentralized wage
setting, which began in the second half of the eighties, has given rise to 
an increase, albeit of relatively modest magnitude, in the dispersion of
wages. The widening wage distribution seems to be predominantly due to
increased wage diﬀerentials between ﬁrms, and considerably less due to
growing within-ﬁrm wage dispersion. In parallel, the level and between-
ﬁrm variance in returns to human capital have increased. The shift toward
decentralized wage bargaining has coincided with deregulation and in-
creased product market competition. The evidence appears not to be con-
sistent with stronger competition in product markets eroding ﬁrm-speciﬁc
rents. Hence, the prime suspect is the change in wage-setting institutions.
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